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3 A cautious embrace: defending democracy in an age of autocracies 
Summary
Democracies today face a greater challenge than ever before. Autocratic states 
are undermining the rules-based international system that has seen freedom and 
prosperity become more widespread. While the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO) recognises the threats, and work is being done across Whitehall to address them 
in the fields of cyber security, disinformation and illicit finance, the efforts to combat 
autocratic interference need to increase if we are to continue to be able to sup at the 
same table. We are going to need a longer spoon.
One area which has not sufficiently been addressed is autocracies’ influence on 
academic freedom in the UK. The FCO’s current focus is on protecting universities 
from intellectual property theft and risks arising from joint research projects. This 
is not enough to protect academic freedom from other types of interference such as 
financial, political or diplomatic pressure, with a view to shaping the research agenda 
or curricula of UK universities or attempts to limit the activities of UK university 
campuses. The FCO and universities should develop together a strategy to address the 
challenges posed by autocracies to UK universities. The FCO should start by examining 
the mounting evidence of foreign influence in UK universities to fully understand the 
extent of the problem. We also recommend that the UK should coordinate with like-
minded countries on academic freedom to stop us from being played off against each 
other using established groups, such as the Commonwealth, to help coordinate. Given 
the cross-departmental nature of the issue, we recommend that a Whitehall Champion 
is appointed to oversee Government efforts to protect academic freedom in the UK and 
share best practice with universities.
Sanctions—the subject of two previous reports by this Committee—are also an important 
foreign policy tool in relation to autocracies. Although the FCO has confirmed that it 
has powers under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (SAMLA) to 
impose sanctions against individuals connected with autocratic regimes, it has not yet 
used these powers. To ensure cross-departmental coherence, and greater effectiveness, 
of the UK’s sanctions policy, we reiterate our recommendation that the Government 
appoint a Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) with personal accountability to the National 
Security Council for devising and implementing sanctions policy. We also call on the 
Government to act with much greater urgency in establishing the power and processes 
with which to block listings in the UK on national security grounds—a potentially 
crucial tool in limiting the influence and reach of autocracies in the UK.
We continue to be concerned by the dangerous erosion of the One Country, Two 
Systems principle of governance in Hong Kong—a key finding of our March 2019 
report on China and the rules-based international system. We reiterate our view that 
the Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong is a legally binding international 
treaty registered at the United Nations. The UK, along with Australia, Canada and 
New Zealand, are judiciaries represented in the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal. The 
FCO should coordinate its response to the Hong Kong crisis with partner governments 
of these judiciaries. We further recommend that the Government grants residency to 
Hong Kong citizens who are British National (Overseas) passport holders in recognition 
of their status as British nationals and as a means of reassurance to UK nationals.
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1 Introduction
1. For the purposes of this inquiry, and to ensure a meaningful examination of the 
UK’s foreign policy regarding autocracies, we define autocratic states as those in which 
governments gain or hold power by means other than democratic elections that meet 
international standards. The Government has acknowledged that autocracies pose a 
challenge to the rules-based international system:1 the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO) describes autocracies’ efforts “to change the rules, norms, and values on which the 
current system is based.”2 In February 2019, we launched an inquiry into the FCO’s policy 
towards autocracies.3 We sought to assess the Government’s response to challenges that 
autocratic states pose to the rules-based international order, and in particular the role 
of the FCO. This inquiry grew out of our more specific investigation of the UK’s China 
policy, which we concluded earlier this year.4
2. We took oral evidence over three sessions between June and October. In addition 
to FCO ministers, we took evidence from human rights activists from China and 
Russia, experts and academics, and stakeholders from UK and US universities involved 
in safeguarding academic freedom.5 This inquiry has been curtailed because of the 
dissolution of Parliament in November 2019. It nonetheless builds on other inquiries in 
this Parliament relating to autocracies, such as those on global media freedom and the use 
of sanctions.6
3. This report focuses on three policy areas: autocracies’ influence on academic 
freedom; the use of sanctions against autocracies; and the UK’s cooperation with other 
democracies in responding to autocracies. It is necessary for the Government to engage 
with autocracies, for reasons of security, trade and tackling issues such as climate change 
and modern slavery. We concentrate in particular on Russia and China. Our evidence 
suggests that both have engaged in overt and covert interference in the affairs of the UK 
and its partners. The two take different approaches to the rules-based system: Russia has 
been accused of actively working to undermine the system,7 whilst China largely works 
within the system, but aims to change it to suit its own goals, which may be very different 
from those of the UK.8 Our evidence cited as examples Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, 
the repression of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, the chemical attack in Salisbury in 2018, 
and attempts at interference in elections within democracies.9
1 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (AFP0022), paras 7–10
2 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (AFP0022), paras 7–10
3 Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘Autocracies and UK Foreign Policy examined’, accessed 30 October 2019
4 Foreign Affairs Committee, Sixteenth Report of Session 2017–19, China and the Rules-Based International 
System, HC 612
5 A full list of the written and oral evidence published by the Committee is available at the back of this report, 
and also on the Committee’s webpage for the inquiry into autocracies and UK foreign policy. We are grateful to 
all who gave us evidence.
6 Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventeenth Report of Session 2017–19, Fragmented and Incoherent: the UK’s 
sanctions policy, HC 1703; Foreign Affairs Committee, Twenty-first Report of Session 2017–19, “Media freedom is 
under attack”: The FCO’s defence of liberty, HC 1920
7 Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2017−19, Moscow’s Gold: Russian corruption in the UK, 
para 20
8 Foreign Affairs Committee, Sixteenth Report of Session 2017–19, China and the Rules-Based International 
System, HC 612, para 9–12 
As Dr Kobayashi told us, China has gone from being a “silent watcher … moving on to participating, and finally 
to revising and reforming” the rules-based international system.
9 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (AFP0022), para 30; The Rights Practice (AFP0027), para 27; Dr Pete Duncan 
(AFP0031), para 10–11
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2 Autocracies’ influence in academia
4. Autocracies’ influence in UK universities is a complex phenomenon which can take 
different forms. Our definition of influence in this context includes:10
Financial, political or diplomatic pressure, to shape the research agenda or curricula of 
UK universities, whether at the macro level (for example, providing direct or indirect 
financial support for research or educational activities with explicit or implicit limits 
on the scope of the subjects that can be discussed) or at the micro level (for example, 
pressuring event organisers not to invite certain speakers);
Attempts to limit the activities of UK university campuses or joint venture universities 
abroad which constrain freedoms that would normally be protected in the UK, such as 
criticisms of foreign governments;
Pressure on UK-based researchers who focus on subjects related to the countries 
concerned, including through visa refusals, pressure on university leadership, pressure 
on relatives still living in that country;
Pressure on UK-based students born in the country concerned, or on their families, to 
inform on the speech or activities of other students, or to engage in political protest in 
the UK in support of the country’s objectives.
5. During our inquiry into China and the rules-based international system, we 
heard alarming evidence about the extent of Chinese influence on the campuses of UK 
universities.11 Despite the fact that there are now over 100,000 Chinese students in the UK, 
the issue of Chinese influence has been the subject of remarkably little debate compared to 
that in Australia, New Zealand and the US.12
6. Universities have a strong incentive to establish overseas partnerships to secure 
funding and enhance collaboration on research projects, but this should be balanced 
with potential risks to academic freedom. Universities UK told us that “the vast majority 
of international partnerships are highly beneficial to all parties and augment the UK’s 
standing on the global stage”13 but warned that there is a significant threat from hostile 
state actors of “misappropriation of research output, including the seizing of research data 
and intellectual property”.14
7. The need for universities to attract more funding and grow internationally can 
come into conflict with the principle of academic freedom. Dr Catherine Owen of the 
University of Exeter highlighted this tension, stating that it was becoming more acute 
10 We wrote to Universities UK and the Russell Group asking whether they were aware of examples of influence as 
defined above.
11 Foreign Affairs Committee, Sixteenth Report of Session 2017–19, China and the Rules-Based International 
System, HC 612, paras 107–111, 
See oral evidence, 8 January 2019, Q124–128, Q143–145, Q152
12 The UK has the second largest share of international students in the world (11%), after the US (24%), many of 
them Chinese. See Higher Education Statistics Agency https://www.hesa.ac.uk/news/11–01–2018/sfr247-higher-
education-student-statistics/location
13 Universities UK (AFP0032), executive summary
14 Universities UK (AFP0032), executive summary
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as the commercialisation of global academia intensifies.15 She noted that “China’s 
internationalising trend in higher education has been accompanied by domestic attempts 
to curb the influence of educational norms and values associated with the West.”16
8. Professor Christopher Hughes of the LSE told us that he had seen Chinese students 
in London engaged in activities that undermine Hong Kong protestors17 and Chinese 
Confucius Institute officials confiscating papers which mention Taiwan at an academic 
conference.18 Charles Parton of RUSI said that the Chinese Students and Scholars 
Association (CSSA), which is supported and partly financed by the Chinese Government, 
was an instrument of this interference: “Its stated aim is to look after Chinese students, 
but it also reports on them to the embassy and authorities, tries to stop discussion of 
topics sensitive to China (Taiwan, Tibet, Tiananmen), and takes more direct action under 
guidance of the embassy.”19 Ayeshagul Nur Ibrahim, an Uyghur Muslim who became 
politically active while studying in the UK, told us how the Chinese Government started 
monitoring her and harassing her family in China.20
9. There are allegations that these efforts are directly coordinated by the Chinese 
Embassy. Earlier this year, SOAS Professor Steve Tsang said:
In one Russell Group University a pro-vice chancellor was spoken to by 
someone in the Chinese embassy and as a result he stood a speaker who was 
already invited down… I am also aware of a vice-chancellor again under 
pressure from the Chinese embassy asking one of his senior academics not 
to make political comments on China at a specified period of time.21
10. Pressure is exerted in other ways. According to one recent media report, managers 
at the University of Nottingham—one of two UK universities with a branch in China—
pressured academics to cancel events relating to Tibet and Taiwan, at the university’s 
15 Dr Catherine Owen (AFP0033), paras 1–7
16 Dr Catherine Owen (AFP0033), paras 5
17 Q42
18 Prof Christopher Hughes told us: “I have seen patriotic Chinese students in Trafalgar Square in London, because 
I went along to look at the Hong Kong demonstration, and I would say it was more like hate crime. The things 
they were saying—“traitor”. I won’t go into the details, but it was really intimidating and threatening. I do not 
think they were students; I do not know who they were. However, it is that kind of activity where there are clear 
links of direction from the consulate”. Q42
19 Parton further notes that: In 2017, Chinese embassy officials in Canberra gave training to hundreds of CSSA 
students to form ‘security squads’ to help drown out protesters during the visit of Premier Li Keqiang to 
Australia. The same thing seems to have happened during Li’s visit to the UK in 2014. In February 2017, the 
CSSA organised students to barricade the building where the Durham University Debating Society had invited 
a speaker who supports the Falun Gong (a spiritual movement banned in China). The Chinese embassy also 
contacted the debating society, asking it to cancel the speaker’s invitation and accusing it of harming the China–
UK ‘Golden Era’.” RUSI, China-UK Relations: Where to Draw the Border Between Influence and Interference?, 
Charles Parton, February 2019, page 15.
20 Q6, Ayeshagul Nur Ibrahim told us: My sister lives away, but she gave me a hint: “Don’t call me too often.” I said, 
“Okay.” Actually, I do not call them too often. Normally I just say, “Hello. How is the family?” and so on. Then 
she told me, “You should be cautious about your activities,” and I thought, “What’s going on?” Then, in a short 
message, she said, “Stop sending anything. We’re all well, so just keep quiet.” Then she said, “I went to the 
police, so you should know.” It was just a short, incomplete sentence. Then she said, “They already know where 
you are. Maybe they will call you.” I was surprised, but I already knew they had cut the landline. My sister is a 
lawyer herself, and I thought about what might happen to her. I was worrying about this, so I cut contact with 
my sister as well because I wanted to protect my family. Then I understood that, as an educated person, if I am 
myself having this pressure, what happens to the ordinary people living there? I am already outside. I am not a 
political activist or somebody who often speaks against the Chinese Government, so if this is happening to me, 
what happens to the people living there under that control all the time?
21 “UK vulnerable to Chinese interference, report says”, BBC News, 20 February 2019
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Chinese and British campuses after complaints from Chinese officials.22 Another reported 
that LSE halted a proposed China studies scheme funded by a pro-Beijing venture capitalist 
after academics raised concerns about its impact on academic freedom.23
11. Similar issues have been reported in other countries. Human Rights Watch published 
a 12-point Code of Conduct for US universities responding to Chinese influence, stating 
that the Chinese government “has stepped up surveillance of diaspora communities, 
including through controls on students and scholars from China”.24
12. Most of the evidence we received related to Chinese influence in UK universities, 
but there are claims that other autocracies pose similar threats. Although Russia’s overall 
influence in UK universities is low, the Russkiy Mir Foundation25—a Russian Government-
sponsored body—is active on UK campuses, according to UCL’s Dr Peter Duncan. He 
told us; “I have personal knowledge of a Russkiy Mir employee planting a bugging device 
to record an academic discussion on Russia held by the British International Studies 
Association in Edinburgh.”26
13. We heard evidence that Central Asian autocracies also put pressure on UK academics. 
Professor John Heathershaw of the University of Exeter said that “travel bans, ‘interviews’ 
with the security services, detentions for hours and days, and threats against family 
members by authorities, are commonplace for academics working on projects with UK 
universities”,27 while a Kazakh study programme is monitored by the country’s national 
security services, and students are subject to surveillance and control measures, including 
through the use of Kazakh societies on UK campuses.28
14. However, university representatives who gave evidence to the inquiry did not 
acknowledge this issue. The Russell Group told us “we are not aware of any significant or 
systematic attempts to influence university activity by foreign actors in any of the ways 
outlined in your letter. Nor have we held any discussions with Ministers or officials about 
improper foreign influence.”29 Bill Rammell, Chairman of Million Plus, which represents 
20 ‘modern universities’ in the UK, said he had “not heard one piece of evidence” that 
substantiates claims of foreign influence in universities.30 When we asked the Minister31 
why there had not been engagement with these organisations specifically about foreign 
interference, she said that she was surprised “because the Department for Education has 
met the Russell Group.”32
15. There are strong signs that the FCO is not treating the issue of interference in academia 
as the priority it should be. Although the Government said in June, in its response to 
22 “Security services fear the march on universities of Beijing’s spies”, The Times, 27 October 2012
23 “London School of Economics academics outraged by proposed China programme”, Financial Times, 
27 October 2019
24 https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/21/china-government-threats-academic-freedom-abroad
25 Russkiy Mir Foundation (Russian: Фонд “Русский мир”, literally “Russian World Foundation”) is a Russian 
government-sponsored organisation formally aiming to promote the Russian language worldwide.
26 Dr Pete Duncan (AFP0031), para 11
27 Dr John Heathershaw, written evidence (AFP0029), para 17
28 Ibid
29 Correspondence 18 March 2019
30 Q39
31 On 22 October, we questioned Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Minister for Asia and the Pacific) 
Heather Wheeler MP, along with FCO Officials Martin Harris, Director of Eastern Europe and Central Asia and 
Kate White, Director of the Asia-Pacific Directorate.
32 Q89
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our China inquiry, that it had initiated work to understand universities’ concerns and 
needs regarding protection from interference, and said it would issue written guidance 
“shortly”, this does not yet appear to have been done, and the FCO made no mention of 
this in its written evidence. When we asked about the FCO’s assessment of the risks posed 
by autocracies to academic freedom in the UK, the relevant FCO Minister told us: “We 
get anecdotal reports, sometimes from universities, that x or y pressures are being applied 
to them. In those situations, the advice that I and my team would always give would 
be absolutely to stand clearly to the values and principles by which their university is 
established”.33 The Minister appeared relaxed when we suggested that there is a discrepancy 
between the FCO’s policy and the urgency of this issue, stating, “at the moment, we have 
not had particular grumbles back, but we want to make sure, through things like the 
trusted research work, that they feel they can come to us, either through the Department 
for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy or the Department for Education.”34
16. Given the weight of the evidence publicly available, we were surprised that the 
FCO’s submission to this inquiry did not identify academia as being a distinct area at 
risk of influence by autocracies. We recommend that the FCO inform the Committee, in 
confidence if necessary, of its assessment of the extent of the problem.
The FCO’s response
17. In 2017–18, UK universities received £8.2 billion in research income, £1.39 billion 
of which came from international sources.35 The Government has stated that research 
collaboration with institutions based in autocratic states “can be vulnerable to misuse 
by organisations and institutions who operate in nations whose democratic and ethical 
values are different from our own.”36 In the UK, ‘Trusted Research’ and ‘academic 
technology approval schemes’ are designed to protect universities working in collaboration 
with foreign institutions, particularly in terms of protecting sensitive technology from 
intellectual theft.37 Trusted Research schemes aim to “secure the integrity of the system 
of international research collaboration, which is vital to the continued success of the UK’s 
research and innovation sector.”38
18. Some UK institutions are reluctant to respond to allegations of influence due to their 
reliance on income from student recruitment and research grants. In the course of the 
inquiry, we sought to examine how other countries address similar issues. Alexander 
Bustamante, of the University of California, said that “one of the items we first identified 
in the beginning was that we did not have an understanding of the scope of the issue.” His 
university sought support from US federal authorities to remedy this.39
19. We note the introduction of the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme in Australia 
(FITSA) in December 2018, with the aim to provide visibility of the nature, level and 
extent of foreign influence on Australia’s Government and political process to the 
public. The scheme introduced registration obligations for persons and entities who have 
arrangements with, and undertake certain activities on behalf of, foreign principals. This 
33 Q94
34 Q78
35 Trusted Research Guidance
36 Ibid
37 Q71
38 Trusted Research guidance https://www.cpni.gov.uk/trusted-research-guidance
39 Q45
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includes universities that are recipients of overseas donations as the FITSA applies to 
universities that undertake political or governmental lobbying, communication activities 
or disbursement activities on behalf of foreign entities. In the US, a recent Senate report 
recommends the US Department of Justice to probe whether Confucius Institutes should 
register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, the American forerunner to Australia’s 
framework.40
20. The FCO told us that they are tracking the way conversations about tackling foreign 
influence in UK universities have unfolded in Australia and other partner countries.41 
When we asked them about the merits of introducing measures such as the Australian 
Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme42 to protect UK universities from malign foreign 
influence, we were told only that the Department’s approach is to carry this forward in its 
open dialogue with the pro-vice-chancellors.43
21. The UK, along with Australia, Canada and the US, is the most popular overseas 
destinations for Chinese students.44 In its 2019 International Education Strategy White 
Paper, the Government makes the case for a whole-of-Government approach to boosting 
the UK higher education sector globally.45 The paper mentions China over 20 times in the 
context of boosting education export to the Chinese market, with no mention of security 
or interference. At present, the international education strategy involves the Department 
of Education and the Department of International Trade, with no evidence of input from 
the FCO.
22. The FCO’s role in advising universities on the potential threats to academia from 
autocracies is non-existent. There is no evidence that it has considered the threat from 
autocracies to academic freedom, which underpins the quality of UK higher education, 
nor engaged sufficiently with other departments to develop a co-ordinated response. 
We believe that it is vital for the FCO to take the lead across Government on this issue, 
given that foreign influence falls directly within the Department’s remit.
23. We are disappointed that the FCO has not made detailed assessments about how 
the UK and its universities should respond to foreign influence in UK academia, and 
at its failure to engage directly with counterparts in the US, Australia or elsewhere 
to share best practice. We recommend that the Government and universities develop 
together a strategy to address the challenges posed by autocracies to UK universities. 
As a starting point, the Government should examine mounting evidence of foreign 
influence in UK universities to fully understand the extent of the problem. This strategy 
should examine the extent to which market incentives may serve to undermine academic 
freedom in the UK. We recommend that the Government share with us in confidence the 
details of this strategy by Autumn 2020.
40 https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/PSI%20Report%20China’s%20Impact%20on%20the%20US%20
Education%20System.pdf
41 Q71
42 The Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme commenced on 10 December 2018. Its purpose is to provide the 
public and government decision-makers with visibility of the nature, level and extent of foreign influence on 
Australia’s government and political process.
43 Q97
44 https://monitor.icef.com/2019/05/chinese-study-destinations-and-post-study-plans-changing-this-year/
45 International Education Strategy, global potential, global growth, March 2019 https://assets.publishing.service.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/799349/International_Education_Strategy_
Accessible.pdf
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24. We further recommend that a Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) is appointed to 
coordinate the FCO’s response to threats to academic freedom. The Government should 
nominate a single point of contact to both gather evidence from, and provide advice to, 
academic institutions on the political, diplomatic and legal implications of accepting 
funding and pursuing collaboration with institutions based in non-democratic states. We 
recommend that the Government appoints a cross-departmental Whitehall champion 
for academic freedom to coordinate the different agencies involved in monitoring and 
responding to foreign influence.
25. We recommend that the Government engages in dialogue with Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand and the US to explore ways to protect universities from attempts by 
autocracies to use their financial muscle to leverage influence through the withdrawal of 
funding. This could take place through existing structures such as the Commonwealth.
26. We welcome the Government’s use and promotion of ‘trusted research’ and 
academic technology approval schemes to protect UK universities from intellectual 
theft that may arise from academic collaboration with universities from autocratic 
states. The Government should continue to support such schemes and provide up-to-date 
guidance to universities on the political, diplomatic and legal implications of accepting 
funding and pursuing collaboration with institutions based in non-democratic states.
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3 Sanctions
Use of sanctions against individuals from autocracies
27. Sanctions are an essential tool in supporting the rules-based international system 
and the defence of the UK’s national interests. The UK, in partnership with the EU, has 
played a leading role in international efforts to sanction terrorist groups, rogue regimes 
and individuals connected with those regimes. Examples have included individuals and 
organisations involved in human rights abuses, illegal arms trade and extraterritorial 
attacks such as the Salisbury chemical attack in 2018. However, as we noted in our June 
2019 report, Fragmented and incoherent: the UK’s sanctions policy, leaving the EU will 
bring about a seismic shift in how the UK adopts, imposes and implements economic and 
financial sanctions, with about two thirds of its current sanctions regimes deriving from 
the EU.46 The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (SAMLA) sets out the 
post-Brexit framework for UK sanctions policy.47
28. Since SAMLA48 received Royal Assent in May 2018, we have repeatedly asked 
Government Ministers and officials whether the UK has the power to make and implement 
its own sanctions on individuals accused of human rights violations—known as ‘Magnitsky 
powers’, in reference to the United States’ 2016 Global Magnitsky Act—while it is still a 
member of the EU. Our June 2019 report on UK sanctions policy after Brexit set out the 
unclear and contradictory answers we had received from FCO Ministers and officials, 
and it called on the Government to resolve this question as soon as possible by agreeing 
on a clear legal position regarding the UK’s ability to adopt and implement Magnitsky 
sanctions while still an EU member and during any possible post-Brexit implementation 
period.49
29. In September, the FCO confirmed in its response to our June report that using the 
Magnitsky-style powers is legally possible.50 The Government, however, has not acted yet 
to resolve the matter. We asked the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Minister for 
Asia and the Pacific) Heather Wheeler MP in October what the Department’s plans were 
for establishing sanctions under SAMLA, and what criteria would be used to determine 
which individuals should be subject to sanctions. These might, for example, be individual 
46 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FSP0015), para 12; Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventeenth Report of 
Session 2017−19, Fragmented and incoherent: the UK’s sanctions policy, para 2
47  Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. The legislation states that the appropriate Minister may 
“make sanctions regulations” under SAMLA if it would: further the prevention of terrorism; be in the interests 
of national security; be in the interests of international peace and security; further foreign policy objectives; 
promote the resolution of armed conflicts or the protection of civilians in conflict zones; provide accountability 
for or be a deterrent to gross violations of human rights; promote compliance with international humanitarian 
law; contribute to multilateral efforts to prevent the spread and use of weapons and materials of mass 
destruction; or promote respect for democracy, the rule of law and good governance. In relation to money 
laundering, the legislation states that the appropriate Minister may “by regulations make provision for”: 
enabling or facilitating the detection or investigation of money laundering, or preventing money laundering; 
enabling or facilitating the detection or investigation of terrorist financing, or preventing terrorist financing; 
or the implementation of Standards published by the Financial Action Task Force from time to time relating to 
combating threats to the integrity of the international financial system.
48 The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018
49 Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventeenth Report of Session 2017−19, Fragmented and incoherent: the UK’s 
sanctions policy, paras 11−18
50 23rd Special Report: Fragmented and incoherent: the UK’s sanctions policy: Government Response to the 
Committee’s Seventeenth Report
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Chinese officials involved in the perpetration of human rights abuses in Xinjiang or Hong 
Kong. Ms Wheeler said that the announcement of a new Statutory Instrument (SI) was 
“imminent” and would cover the criteria and the possibility to “include names.”51
30. After considerable delay, the FCO has now established that it is legally possible 
for the UK unilaterally to impose sanctions on individuals and organisations while 
still a member of the European Union. However, the Minister was not able to tell us 
how the FCO plans to use these so-called ‘Magnitsky powers’, the criteria on which 
individuals will be selected for sanctions, or the date on which the FCO would lay 
the relevant Statutory Instrument before Parliament—a process which will now be 
further delayed by the 2019 General Election. The FCO has been far too slow to make 
use of this important foreign-policy tool in countering the abuse of human rights by 
countries such as China and Russia, and more broadly in support of the rules-based 
international system.
31. In its response to this report, the FCO should explain why it has not yet used 
Magnitsky-style sanctions in response to ongoing repression by the state authorities in 
Hong Kong and Xinjiang, what plans it has to do so, and how far these plans have 
progressed. It should also state how it is seeking to coordinate with the EU when designing 
and imposing sanctions on individuals and organisations connected to autocratic 
regimes. The FCO should further set out in the Statutory Instrument to be laid before 
Parliament the criteria for determining which individuals and organisations should be 
subject to UK Government sanctions.
32. During our inquiry, we heard about the potential power of sanctions in curbing the 
egregious actions of autocracies, and of individuals and organisations connected with 
them. For example, Dr Pete Duncan, Associate Professor of Russian Politics and Society at 
UCL, highlighted the effectiveness of sanctions imposed by the UK and its international 
partners on Russian targets following the annexation of Crimea in 2014.52 He argued that 
the overall impact of these sanctions had led to a decline in the Russian economy which 
has had, in turn, a negative effect on Putin’s domestic approval ratings.53 Some witnesses 
called for the UK to be more robust in its approach when implementing its independent 
regime. Russian dissident businessman Aleksey Shmatko told us that sanctions lists 
should be expanded to include the relatives, business partners and other associates of 
Russian officials.54 The Sentry—an investigative and policy team that follows “dirty 
money” linked with conflicts in Africa—stated that the UK should go further in its efforts 
to use sanctions to “encourage the resolution of political crises and armed conflicts”, by 
“developing new sanctions targeting leaders, their support networks, and the companies 
that they own or control.”55
33. The Sentry also pointed to the importance of cross-government collaboration on 
sanctions, stating that “UK foreign policy must also work alongside other Whitehall 
departments to ensure that sanctions are not only imposed, but effectively implemented 
… ”.56 This echoes the evidence we took during our previous inquiry on the future of 
UK sanctions policy. In our report, we concluded that there was room for improvement 
51 Q122, Q132
52 Dr Peter Duncan (AFP0031) para 7
53 Ibid
54 Q11 [Aleksey Shmatko]
55 The Sentry (AFP0009) para 18(iii)
56 Ibid
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in relation to cooperation between departments, which should in turn support the 
development of a more coherent overall strategy on sanctions.57 The Government said in 
its response to that report that it would only “consider the Committee’s recommendation 
to create an SRO [Senior Responsible Owner] role within the FCO to be accountable for 
sanctions policy and implementation” on the basis that there are already SROs providing 
oversight of sanctions policy.58 We reiterate our recommendation that the Government 
appoint a Senior Responsible Official with personal accountability to the National 
Security Council for devising and implementing sanctions policy. This is a necessary 
step to ensure the cross-departmental coherence, and greater effectiveness, of the UK’s 
sanctions policy.
Rooting out ‘dirty money’ in the UK economy
34. As we stated in our May 2018 report Moscow’s Gold: Russian corruption in the UK, 
money laundering is a foreign policy issue: it allows those who would do harm to the 
UK to hide their wealth and obscure their sources of financial support.59 Our June 2019 
report on the future of UK sanctions policy further explored the implications of the 
Government’s currently fragmented approach. One case study was the listing of the energy 
firm En+ Group, which, at the time of its initial public offering (IPO) on the London Stock 
Exchange in November 2017, was controlled by Kremlin associate Oleg Deripaska.60 We 
concluded that:
Although the involvement of an individual such as Oleg Deripaska may 
have raised red flags at the FCO and elsewhere, there was evidently no 
mechanism for those concerns to be conveyed, and no requirement for the 
Financial Conduct Authority to consult national security experts.61
35. Witnesses to this inquiry have also pointed to the importance of disrupting the 
flow of ‘dirty money’ as a means of countering the influence of autocracies in the UK. 
The Henry Jackson Society, for example, suggested that the UK should apply tougher 
anti-money-laundering legislation to root out corrupt money from the economy.62 This 
includes the expansion of ‘Unexplained Wealth Orders’ (UWO), established under the 
Criminal Finances Act 2017, which require foreign wealthy individuals to explain how they 
made their wealth or risk having their assets in the UK seized.63 In October 2017, a joint 
investigative journalism project by Novaya Gazeta (a Russian investigative newspaper) 
and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP—a global non-
profit media organisation founded in the US) reported that $24 billion of unexplained 
wealth belonging to Vladimir Putin’s inner circle was often hidden in Western Europe.64
57 Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventeenth Report of Session 2017−19, Fragmented and incoherent: the UK’s 
sanctions policy, para 28
58 Foreign Affairs Committee, Twenty-third Special Report of Session 2017−19, Fragmented and incoherent: the 
UK’s sanctions policy: Government Response to the Committee’s Seventeenth Report, para 8
59 Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2017−19, Moscow’s Gold: Russian corruption in the UK, 
para 45
60 The Treasury Select Committee also explored the listing of En+ on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) in its report 
on Economic Crime.
61 Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventeenth Report of Session 2017−19, Fragmented and incoherent: the UK’s 
sanctions policy, para 40
62 Henry Jackson Society (AFP0017) para 4.1
63 Ibid
64 Putin and the proxies https://www.occrp.org/en/putinandtheproxies/
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36. The Government has previously told us, in its response to our June 2019 report 
Fragmented and incoherent: the UK’s sanctions policy, that it was exploring the possibility 
of blocking stock exchange listings on the London Stock Exchange on national security 
grounds, potentially through changes to the legislative framework.65 It has also considered, 
at our recommendation, what role the National Security Council and its secretariat should 
play in the use of this power, and how best to formalise links between the Government 
departments responsible for sanctions and arms-length bodies including the Financial 
Conduct Authority, which is ultimately responsible for overseeing listings in the UK. 
The evidence we have taken during this inquiry on the ways in which autocracies can 
establish a foothold in the UK economy has only underscored the need for urgent 
Government action in this regard. We recommend that the Government acts with much 
greater urgency in establishing a power to block listings in the UK on national security 
grounds—a potentially crucial tool in limiting the influence and reach of autocracies in 
the UK. We expect the Government to update our successor Committee on its progress 
no later than May 2020.
65 Foreign Affairs Committee, Twenty-third Special Report of Session 2017−19, Fragmented and incoherent: the 
UK’s sanctions policy: Government Response to the Committee’s Seventeenth Report, paras 11−12
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4 Hong Kong and Interpol
37. One of the aims of this inquiry is to examine in what ways the UK should work 
with its democratic partners on the international stage. This chapter focuses on the UK’s 
response to the crisis in Hong Kong and the ways in which the UK can cooperate with 
democracies through Interpol to counter influence from autocracies.
Hong Kong
38. In April 2019, our report on China and the international rules-based system noted the 
dangerous erosion of the One Country, Two Systems principle of governance in Hong Kong. 
Since then, the situation has markedly deteriorated. We reiterate our view that the Sino-
British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong is a legally binding international treaty registered 
at the United Nations. Its validity and implementation are of profound importance both 
to UK national interests and to the health of the rules-based international system. We are 
therefore deeply concerned by the events in Hong Kong over the last six months, which 
have demonstrated that Hong Kong’s autonomy is at risk, especially in the area of the rule 
of law, which underpins its economy.
39. As one of the judiciaries represented in the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal (CFA), 
we believe that there could be a reputational risk to the UK if the Government inadvertently 
appears complicit in supporting and participating in a system that is undermining the rule 
of law. In August, we wrote to our counterparts in the parliaments of Australia, Canada 
and New Zealand, also represented on the CFA, to urge our governments to assess the 
impact of continued participation in the CFA if current trends continue.
40. The issue of British National Overseas passport holders has also come to our attention 
in the course of this inquiry. As individuals holding the BN(O) passports do not have 
British citizenship, they do not benefit from the same rights accorded to UK citizens. 
In the context of the well-documented arrests of pro-democracy demonstrators, book 
sellers and political activists, we are concerned that BN(O) passport holders, by reason 
of not having the right of abode in the UK, may become more vulnerable to arrests by 
authorities.66
41. In its response to this report, the Government should provide us with its assessment 
of the reputational risk to the UK being an active participant in the Hong Kong judiciary. 
We recommend that the Government coordinates its response to the Hong Kong crisis 
with the governments of Australia, Canada and New Zealand as judiciaries represented 
in the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal. We further recommend that the Government 
extends the right of abode to Hong Kong residents who are British National (Overseas) 
passport holders as a means of reassurance that the UK cares about its nationals.
66 https://www.ft.com/content/f91059fa-cae6–11e9-af46-b09e8bfe60c0
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Interpol
42. We considered the growing problem of political abuse of Interpol, an important 
multilateral organisation, by autocracies. Contributors to the inquiry told us that political 
abuse of Interpol, primarily by autocracies, is a growing problem in the organisation in 
the area of red notices.67
43. Currently, draft red notices enter databases and are shared across the police database 
systems of Interpol member states. Although a red notice requires approval from Interpol 
itself, a ‘diffusion’ notice can be circulated by and among any member of the organisation. 
Crucially, the notices are acted upon irrespective of whether additional checks have been 
done to ascertain the motive of the request. Professor Heathershaw told us reforms of 
the red notice system were supposed to “ensure that the checks would be done more 
thoroughly in advance, but we still see cases where unregistered refugees are being held 
up at airports, which they should not be, according to Interpol processes, but they are, 
because of the requests of authoritarian states.”68
44. We believe that the financial leverage of the UK and its democratic partners in 
Interpol is considerable and should be used to counter abuses. Dr Ted Bromund, Senior 
Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation in the US, said that “autocracies may stand 
on a roughly equal plane with the democracies in the General Assembly, but they do 
not control it financially.”69 To illustrate this, of the top 25 contributors to Interpol, 20 
are democratic states, collectively paying 78.1 % of Interpol’s statutory contributions. 
On the other hand, the only non-democracies in the top 30 contributors are China (2.03 
million euros), Russia (958,000 euros), and Saudi Arabia (437,000 euros).70 Ted Bromund 
noted that “all four of these nations contributed only 785,000 euros more in 2017 than the 
United Kingdom did by itself.”71
45. We recommend that the FCO steps up its work with the Interpol National Central 
Bureau (NCB) and its counterparts in democratic states within Interpol to collectively 
encourage reform of the red notice system to protect it from abuse by autocracies.
67 A Red Notice is a request to law enforcement worldwide to locate and provisionally arrest a person pending 
extradition, surrender, or similar legal action.
68 Dr John Heathershaw, written evidence (AFP0029), para 14
69 Dr Theodore Bromund, written evidence (AFP0028), para 16
70 Ibid para 18
71 Ibid para 18
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Conclusions and recommendations
Autocracies’ influence in academia
1. Given the weight of the evidence publicly available, we were surprised that the FCO’s 
submission to this inquiry did not identify academia as being a distinct area at risk 
of influence by autocracies. We recommend that the FCO inform the Committee, in 
confidence if necessary, of its assessment of the extent of the problem. (Paragraph 16)
2. The FCO’s role in advising universities on the potential threats to academia from 
autocracies is non-existent. There is no evidence that it has considered the threat 
from autocracies to academic freedom, which underpins the quality of UK higher 
education, nor engaged sufficiently with other departments to develop a co-ordinated 
response. We believe that it is vital for the FCO to take the lead across Government 
on this issue, given that foreign influence falls directly within the Department’s remit. 
(Paragraph 22)
3. We are disappointed that the FCO has not made detailed assessments about how the 
UK and its universities should respond to foreign influence in UK academia, and 
at its failure to engage directly with counterparts in the US, Australia or elsewhere 
to share best practice. We recommend that the Government and universities develop 
together a strategy to address the challenges posed by autocracies to UK universities. 
As a starting point, the Government should examine mounting evidence of foreign 
influence in UK universities to fully understand the extent of the problem. This 
strategy should examine the extent to which market incentives may serve to undermine 
academic freedom in the UK. We recommend that the Government share with us in 
confidence the details of this strategy by Autumn 2020. (Paragraph 23)
4. We further recommend that a Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) is appointed to 
coordinate the FCO’s response to threats to academic freedom. The Government should 
nominate a single point of contact to both gather evidence from, and provide advice to, 
academic institutions on the political, diplomatic and legal implications of accepting 
funding and pursuing collaboration with institutions based in non-democratic states. 
We recommend that the Government appoints a cross-departmental Whitehall 
champion for academic freedom to coordinate the different agencies involved in 
monitoring and responding to foreign influence. (Paragraph 24)
5. We recommend that the Government engages in dialogue with Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand and the US to explore ways to protect universities from attempts by 
autocracies to use their financial muscle to leverage influence through the withdrawal of 
funding. This could take place through existing structures such as the Commonwealth. 
(Paragraph 25)
6. We welcome the Government’s use and promotion of ‘trusted research’ and 
academic technology approval schemes to protect UK universities from intellectual 
theft that may arise from academic collaboration with universities from autocratic 
states. The Government should continue to support such schemes and provide up-
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to-date guidance to universities on the political, diplomatic and legal implications 
of accepting funding and pursuing collaboration with institutions based in non-
democratic states. (Paragraph 26)
Sanctions
7. After considerable delay, the FCO has now established that it is legally possible for 
the UK unilaterally to impose sanctions on individuals and organisations while still 
a member of the European Union. However, the Minister was not able to tell us 
how the FCO plans to use these so-called ‘Magnitsky powers’, the criteria on which 
individuals will be selected for sanctions, or the date on which the FCO would lay 
the relevant Statutory Instrument before Parliament—a process which will now be 
further delayed by the 2019 General Election. The FCO has been far too slow to 
make use of this important foreign-policy tool in countering the abuse of human 
rights by countries such as China and Russia, and more broadly in support of the 
rules-based international system. (Paragraph 30)
8. In its response to this report, the FCO should explain why it has not yet used Magnitsky-
style sanctions in response to ongoing repression by the state authorities in Hong Kong 
and Xinjiang, what plans it has to do so, and how far these plans have progressed. 
It should also state how it is seeking to coordinate with the EU when designing and 
imposing sanctions on individuals and organisations connected to autocratic regimes. 
The FCO should further set out in the Statutory Instrument to be laid before Parliament 
the criteria for determining which individuals and organisations should be subject to 
UK Government sanctions. (Paragraph 31)
9. We reiterate our recommendation that the Government appoint a Senior Responsible 
Official with personal accountability to the National Security Council for devising 
and implementing sanctions policy. This is a necessary step to ensure the cross-
departmental coherence, and greater effectiveness, of the UK’s sanctions policy. 
(Paragraph 33)
10. We recommend that the Government acts with much greater urgency in establishing a 
power to block listings in the UK on national security grounds—a potentially crucial 
tool in limiting the influence and reach of autocracies in the UK. We expect the 
Government to update our successor Committee on its progress no later than May 
2020. (Paragraph 36)
Hong Kong and Interpol
11. In its response to this report, the Government should provide us with its assessment of 
the reputational risk to the UK being an active participant in the Hong Kong judiciary. 
We recommend that the Government coordinates its response to the Hong Kong 
crisis with the governments of Australia, Canada and New Zealand as judiciaries 
represented in the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal. We further recommend that 
the Government extends the right of abode to Hong Kong residents who are British 
National (Overseas) passport holders as a means of reassurance that the UK cares 
about its nationals. (Paragraph 41)
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12. We recommend that the FCO steps up its work with the Interpol National Central 
Bureau (NCB) and its counterparts in democratic states within Interpol to collectively 
encourage reform of the red notice system to protect it from abuse by autocracies. 
(Paragraph 45)
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Formal minutes
Monday 4 November 2019
Members present:
Tom Tugendhat, in the Chair
Ann Clwyd
Andrew Rosindell
Royston Smith
Draft Report (A cautious embrace: defending democracy in an age of autocracies), proposed 
by the Chair, brought up and read.
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Summary agreed to.
Paragraphs 1 to 45 read and agreed to.
Resolved, That the Report be the Second Report of the Committee to the House.
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the 
provisions of Standing Order No. 134.
[The Committee adjourned
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Witnesses
The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications 
page of the Committee’s website.
Wednesday 5 June 2019
Aleksey Shmatko, Businessman, Jihyun Park, North Korean defector 
and human rights activist and Outreach Director, Connect North Korea, 
Ayeshagul Nur Ibrahim, Uyghur activist Q1–12
Dr Oisín Tansey, Reader in Comparative and International Politics, King’s 
College London, Annette Bohr, Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia 
Programme, Chatham House, Professor John Heathershaw, Professor of 
International Relations, University of Exeter Q13–34
Tuesday 3 September 2019
Bill Rammell, Vice Chancellor, University of Bedfordshire and Chair of 
Million Plus, Professor Christopher Hughes, Professor of International 
Relations, LSE, Alexander Bustamante, Senior Vice President and Chief 
Compliance and Audit Officer, University of California Q35–69
Tuesday 22 October 2019
Heather Wheeler MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Martin 
Harris, Director, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Kate White, Director, 
Asia-Pacific Directorate, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Q70–163
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Published written evidence
The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications 
page of the Committee’s website.
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30 Universities UK (AFP0032)
31 War on Want (AFP0013)
32 Wearing, Dr David (AFP0010)
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